Elect the Council
Motivation and Proposals
Version 5
Towards a legitimate and effective UN Security Council

At a time of unprecedented global insecurity and turmoil the world needs a legitimate and effective United Nations Security Council (UNSC). There is little prospect of progress towards this goal in the intergovernmental negotiations in New York that is charged with this process.

Elect the Council invites comments on this fifth revised version of its proposals for reform of the UNSC. A final document will be the basis for a global mobilization and advocacy campaign. That campaign will work with civil society partners, business, and academics and interested states to advocate for an enabling resolution by two thirds of the member states of the UN General Assembly (UNGA).

Elect the Council proposes to do away with permanent seats on the UNSC and the veto and to move towards a system where the majority of states are elected to the Council on a proportional basis, bound to four technical requirements for candidacy. In addition, global powers (or groups of states) that exceed a set proportion of the world’s population, economy and military expenditure will automatically qualify for seats. As a result, after a 20-year transition the UNSC will consist of 24 elected states plus the two or three states that will expectedly automatically qualify due to their size and influence. Eight of the 24 elected states will be elected for five-year terms and will be immediately re-electable. The remaining 16 states will be elected for three years but not be re-electable. The current five electoral regions that elect the ten non-permanent members of the UNSC will nominate candidates for election by simple majority in the UNGA in line with current practice although changes to the composition of the regions should be pursued.

During the 20-year transition period the current five Permanent Members of the Security Council (P5) will remain members of the Council without the need to stand for election. This means that the UNSC will consist of 26 states during this period, since three of the P5 will occupy three of the eight five-year elected seats. The P5 will also be provided with additional voting privileges during this period.

Finally, the outgoing UNSC will be requested to compile a list of up to five intractable issues that, for a period of up to 20 years, may not be subject to a Chapter VII UNSC resolution beyond updates, removal or maintenance.

A mandatory review of the UNSC will occur every 30 years that must come to a conclusion within 3 years.

All Security Council decisions will require an affirmative two-thirds majority.
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WHY NOW?

There will never be a perfect moment for reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but the longer it takes to start this process the more difficult it will become in an increasingly turbulent, interconnected and dynamic world where power is shifting.

The world is changing, but not the UNSC. Established at the height of the colonial period by 51 states 71 years ago, the UN now has 193 member states that coexist, compete and cooperate in a world that is very different from 1945. Beyond a threefold increase in the global population, the 21st century is characterised by a diffusion of power (away from states); an accompanying shift in relative material power and influence (from West to East); and an ongoing transition from a brief period of unipolarity to greater multipolarity. Today the world is experiencing greater turbulence and although it is more connected than before it is also less multilateral in key aspects. The result is a brittle global system and a decrease in adherence to global norms on the use of force, amongst others.

Greater multipolarity does not imply instability, but global transitions such as those experienced currently are inherently disruptive. An increasingly hot, flat and crowded world needs an effective and legitimate UNSC to confront and manage common global threats. Transnational threats such as terrorism and cybercrime are already straining national capacities, while globally armed conflicts are increasing, reversing the sharp downturns seen after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Yet we are stuck with a global peace and security governance architecture dating from the first half of the previous century.

While a transformed UNSC is no panacea for the efficient management of international peace and security issues, the Council still has unparalleled legitimacy and serves as the pre-eminent global shock absorber through which the international community can confront shared challenges and responsibilities. The UNSC is the only executive body on international peace and security issues and its decisions are binding.

It is not possible to quantify the impact of greater legitimacy on the effectiveness or efficiency of the UNSC. Many analysts argue that the current inefficiencies serve the interests of the five permanent members (the P5) by providing them with sufficient freedom of action to act outside the Council in their national interest. Outside the P5 there is broad consensus that the power of the veto is particularly problematic. A P5 member can prevent the adoption of any (non-procedural) UNSC resolution not to its liking. Even the threat of a veto may lead to changes in the text of a resolution or its being withheld altogether (the ‘pocket veto’).

The location of the UNSC at the apex of the UN system and the power granted to these five states cascades through every level of the UN, enhancing and reinforcing their influence to complement their economic size and nuclear weaponry. Instead of protecting the weak against the strong, this privilege reinforces the ability of the P5 members to extend their already significant influence.

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The power of the veto often prevents the Council from acting to address pressing international issues and affords the P5 great influence within the UN system as a whole, including in the appointment of the UN secretary general and amendments to the UN Charter. The lack of reform at this level has an impact on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the entire UN system. It has hamstrung effective reform of the UN Human Rights Council and the enlargement of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), both of which tried to institute structural change with limited success. Elsewhere, in the case of the International Financial Institutions, the lack of reform in the distribution of voting rights has already seen the establishment of alternative financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank (previously the BRICS Development Bank after Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). And currently the politics and conduct of the Security Council vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court have come to confirm the skewed nature of power distribution within the Council.

If there is no progress in resolving the current impasse on UNSC reform it may, in time, delegitimise the entire UN system and some regions may eventually choose to establish alternative systems on peace and security that operate in parallel to the UNSC and not necessarily in consort with it.

A FRUSTRATED HISTORY

After the 1965 enlargement of the non-permanent seats of the UNSC from six to 10 members, reform has been on the agenda of the UNGA since 1979, when India – supported by a number of others – and then Latin American states - proposed changes to size and regions.¹ With only China (then represented by the Nationalist Government based in Taiwan) among the P5 in favour of expansion, no substantive discussions were held and the issue was deferred year after year until eight states revitalised the debate at the 47th Session of the UNGA in 1991.² In December 1992 UNSC reform was added to the agenda of the UNGA.³ In 1993 this resulted in the establishment of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and included in the provisional agenda of the 49th UNGA session the item ‘Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters’.⁴ Ahead of that, the UNSG report dated 20 July 1993 set out the comments received from 75 member states on UNSC reform.⁵

A March 1997 paper by the president of the General Assembly and chairperson of the OEWG, Ambassador Razali Ismael from Malaysia, presented a draft resolution that called for the addition of five permanent seats without veto power and four non-permanent seats,⁶ but it did not garner enough support.

A year later, the UNGA reaffirmed that it would ‘not ... adopt any resolution or decision on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters, without the affirmative vote of at least two thirds of the Members of the General Assembly’.⁷ The subsequent 2000 Millennium Summit, in its final document, could only commit ‘to intensify ... efforts to achieve comprehensive reform of the Council in all its aspects’ – a commitment repeated after the 2005 Summit.
In 2006/07, the president of the UNGA again convened a series of meetings of the OEWG on the ‘Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council’. Two sets of facilitators were appointed, first consisting of five and then two members to guide the process. In September 2007, it was agreed to start intergovernmental negotiations, the modalities of which were only finalised a year later in Decision 62/557. Part of this decision is the requirement for a solution that ‘can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States.’ Negotiations officially started early in 2009. Subsequent years saw the development of a 30-page ‘negotiation text’ based on submissions from member states that soon led to an impasse over version 2 versus version 3, among others.

During the 2005/07 efforts the G4 group, comprising Brazil, India, Japan and Germany, battled it out to stalemate with the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group, the African Group and others. Lacklustre meetings thereafter produced no progress and the process has been effectively moribund for several years.

In April 2015, and after several months of consultations, the then chairperson of the intergovernmental committee on UN Security Council reform, Jamaican Ambassador E Courtenay Rattray, embarked on a clean slate approach. Instead of trying to unblock the impasse, he circulated a one-page ‘framework’ outline consisting of various headings, which member states were requested to populate with their suggestions on reform. By mid-May, Rattray had received inputs from states and groups that represented close to two-thirds of the member states of the UN. These included input from 30 individual states plus the Africa group, the L69 (representing states from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific), the G4 and Guyana (on behalf of 12 small island states). These recommendations were subsequently summarised in a 24-page consolidated framework document.

Impressive as the response is, opposition is strong. Several blocks and states (the Arab Group, Uniting for Consensus, China, Russian Federation, US, and Lao) did not want their proposals to be included in the body of summarized text and a number of states appear to be members of two or more groups, apparently support different proposals.

China rejected Rattray’s approach, deferring to an earlier negotiation text and was initially supported by Italy (on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group) as well as did the 22-member Arab group. Although not rejecting the clean slate approach, Russia and the USA, in their separate responses insisted that no reform should tamper with the prerogatives of the current permanent members, including the right of veto. France indicated it would not oppose the expansion of the veto to additional permanent members while the United Kingdom opposed such expansion.

In August 2015 Kutesa distributed a slightly shorter version of the populated framework, with the dissenting opinions still reflected in an Annex. On the 14th of September 2015 the General Assembly adopted, by consensus, Decision 69/650 in which Member States decided to immediately continue the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform (IGN) during the 70th session of the General Assembly, “building on the informal meetings held during its sixty-ninth session, as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member
States reflected in the text and its annex circulated by the President of the General Assembly in his letter dated 31 July 2015”.

Eventually the new President of the UNGA, Mogens Lykketoft from Denmark appointed Ambassador Sylvie Lucas of Luxembourg as new chairperson of the intergovernmental process on UN Security Council Reform. It was widely reported that pressure from some P5 members on the government of Jamaica prevented Rattray’s reappointment.16

After a number of desultory meetings where member states restated their well-known positions, the president of the UNGA circulated a letter and short attachment ‘Elements of convergence on two key issues of Security Council reform: the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, and the size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council’ from Amb Lucas on 17 May 2016 that now appeared to abandoned the efforts to develop a text for negotiation. Amb Lucas subsequently departed from New York to take up other duties and the PGA for the 71st session is the Permanent Representative of Fiji, Amb Peter Thomson who, in turn appointed two co-chairs of the intergovernmental process, Amb Mohamed Khiari of Tunisia and Amb Ion Jinga of Romania. Ahead of the 3rd IGN session early in April 2017 the co-chairs circulated a short document on elements of convergence, communalities and issues for further conversation.

In summary, the impasse on reform remain as entrenched today as it has been for several decades and the prospects for progress are faint. (See Annex B for additional information on previous efforts at UNSC reform.)

THE IMPASSE

Since 1964 no effort at UNSC has been able to garner sufficient support in the UNGA, and with global competition and flux at its current level it is unlikely that a state-led process could produce a different result without a change in approach. As was evident from its inability to act on Syria and Ukraine in 2014 and 2015, the veto – or the threat of using it – by any of the P5 members paralyses the Council. Today the veto is the most serious impediment to the ability of the UNSC to fulfil its global mandate. Apart from the fact that most of the so-called penholders, which take charge of a particular topic, are among the P5, every draft resolution needs to satisfy all the P5 members. The result is often a rush to the lowest common denominator, with efforts to keep the P5 on board taking precedence over all other considerations.17

The inordinate influence that the P5 has on the workings and decision of the Council is a particular source of frustration to African states, since this is where the UNSC expends most of its efforts. Divisions amongst the P5 frustrate efforts to engage constructively on the Middle East while it is very likely that the Council will continue to need to focus on supporting Africa and the Middle East, the two regions with the highest armed conflict and terrorist burden globally.
Publically, the P5 members keep a low profile on reform given their preference for maintaining the status quo, for reform that would not dilute their privilege and for a global system that does not to constrain their freedom of action. The US, UK and France (the P3) typically emphasise the burden of responsibility and the need for adequate resources (diplomatic, military and other) required to fulfil their self-appropriated duties. Aspirant middle powers to permanent seats such as Germany, India, Brazil and Japan find their ambitions blocked by regional competitors (Uniting for Consensus in particular), the lack of agreement on a formula for expanding the Council to achieve greater regional balance (particularly for Africa and Latin America), and a proposal that would see additional European representation on a Council that already has two permanent seats from that region. The dynamics around Brexit and the election of President Donald Trump have further complicated reform dynamics.

When critics point out that the veto makes the Council dysfunctional, it is difficult to argue that an increase in the number of states with this power would improve efficiency. As a result, it appears unlikely that the majority of member states would agree to allow additional states a veto, as advocated in various forms by the G4, L69 and the African Group. In fact, the L69 and African Group’s starting position is that the veto should be abolished, but that if it is retained then new permanent members should be accorded the same rights and privileges as existing permanent members.

This history of frustrated reform efforts indicates that a realistic prospect for movement needs to balance three divergent requirements: the constraints of power politics (P5 intransigence in particular); the need for effectiveness/capacity; and the need for increased legitimacy and representation. This is a task that would necessarily have to unfold over time, to accompany rather than pre-empt global re-alignments in power and influence.

Figure 1: The elusive sweet spot

At member state level reform efforts face five obstacles. First there is the challenge of accommodating the two great powers of the first part of the 21st century – the US and China – both very comfortable with the veto power. Second is the challenge to accommodate India, the next global power as well as the practical need to bring regional leaders onto the Council. At the other extreme is the demand from smaller states for equal treatment and the opportunity to also serve on the Council, and hence their rejection of efforts to establish a benchmark consisting of minimum criteria that they may be unable to meet. In between these two groups are the UK, France and Russia, all of which are well served by the current
arrangement, which accords them privileges they could not otherwise obtain, and countries such as Brazil, Japan and Germany that have been engaged in fruitless campaign for permanency. Then there are the ‘others’ (generally identified with Uniting for Consensus) – a grouping that includes regional contenders and states with principled objections intent on blocking the efforts of regional powers (and aspirants to permanent seats) to entrench their purported regional privilege. These divisions hide the reality that many states are, in fact, quite comfortable with the current arrangement.

**SIZE**

There is no ideal size for a reformed UNSC. Generally, the P5 members argue for a smaller increase in the size of a future Council based on their stated emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency. Many in the developing world, on the other hand, argue for a larger increase in the interests of legitimacy and representation. Neither Africa nor Latin America is currently represented among the P5, implying that any effort at equity in representation necessarily involves an increase in numbers.

A review of the responses that have been received from UN member states in 2015 would indicate an emerging consensus on an increase from the current 15 to a maximum of up to 27 members.

Then there are the criteria for candidacy. Some states resist minimum criteria that could bar a country from standing as a candidate, insisting on the right of all states to contest for UNSC membership. More than 60 UN member states have never been members of the UNSC and a substantial number of these have never contested for such a position. Various groups, the Small Island and Developing States (SIDS), are concerned that a Council only composed of larger states will not serve their interests.

It is important to recognise the large disparities in population and economic and military size between members of the UNGA, which underpin the requirement for minimum criteria for membership of the UNSC – as well as the importance of ensuring that global powers are included. For example, in theory it is possible for 129 states with a combined 8% of global population to command a two-thirds vote in the UNGA – or for 65 states with less than 1% of global population to block a substantive vote requiring a two-thirds majority in the UNGA. The disparities in economic size are even larger. This would be a huge obstacle to reform if all states were part of a single electoral college, but the system in which states are grouped in regions for UNSC electoral purposes provides a practical constraint to a potential dictatorship of minorities.

Our analysis has led us to three key conclusions that inform the subsequent proposals. First, states that serve on the UNSC should have a minimum capacity and track record if they are to contribute to global peace and security issues. Second, a council that does not include the global powers of the 21st Century will suffer from lack of gravitas. Third, a distinction needs to be made between regional leaders and other states deserving to serve on the UNSC.
FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE

Outside the UNSC, most modern treaty-based arrangements are based on ‘one country, one vote’. This is a general electoral and representative norm that is far more widely established today than was the case in 1945 when the UN Charter was signed. It is also the point of departure for the proposals on reform by Elect the Council, given the centrality of the state to the UN Charter. At the same time a few states, the USA and China (and likely India in the not too distant future), are significantly larger and globally more influential than any others. It is also possible that groups of states (such as the EU that is embarked on a process to revise and implement its Common Foreign and Security Policy) may wish to have their engagement within the UNSC reflect the eventual outcome of deeper integration.22

It is unlikely that a proposal that does not provide for the inclusion of global powers (or groups of states who so desire) will be able to garner the required legitimacy and influence. Three proportional measurements (population, economic size and military expenditure) would suffice in distinguishing these purported global powers from regional powers and other influential states that can collectively create a UNSC fit for purpose.23

Elect the Council proposes to do away with permanent seats on the UNSC and the veto and to move towards a system where states are elected to the Council bound to four technical requirements for candidacy. In addition, global powers that exceed a set proportion of the world’s population, economy and military expenditure will automatically qualify for seats with enhanced voting rights. As a result, after a 20-year transition the UNSC will consist of 24 elected states elected on a proportional basis plus the two or three states (or groups serving in this capacity) that will expectedly automatically qualify due to their size and influence.

Eight of the 24 elected states will be elected for five-year terms and will be immediately re-electable. The remaining 16 states will be elected for three years but not be immediately re-electable. The current five electoral regions that elect the ten non-permanent members of the UNSC will nominate candidates for election by simple majority in the UNGA in line with current practice.

During the 20-year transition period the current five Permanent Members of the Security Council (P5) will remain members of the Council without the need to stand for election. Three of the P5 will occupy three of the eight five-year elected seats. The P5 will also be provided with additional voting privileges during this period.

Finally, the outgoing UNSC will be requested to compile a list of up to five intractable issues that, for a period of up to 30 years, may not be subject to a Chapter VII UNSC resolution beyond the renewal and revisions of existing mandates. Under dire and specific circumstances this provision could be overruled by a supermajority, i.e. an 80% affirmative vote.

After the 20-year transition the vote by a global power (or group of states that collectively meet the associated criteria and act as one) will count for three votes.
Member states may also wish to change the composition of the current regions that vote for non-permanent seats on the UNSC, namely the Eastern European Group (EEG), the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), the African Group and the Asia-Pacific Group. Such changes do not require an amendment to the Charter and would not impact upon the reform proposals by Elect the Council. Annex C lists the states currently in each group.

Finally, Elect the Council proposes a mandatory review of the functions, role, composition and rules of procedure of the UNSC every 30 years that must come to a conclusion within 3 years each time. The first review will occur 30 years after the original enabling UNGA resolution. This will be done on the basis of a self-reflective report prepared and finalized by the UNSC that may include recommendations for reform as appropriate. The report will be adopted through the normal voting procedures of the UNSC and then submitted for consideration, comment and discussion by the UNGA during year 31. Should this process not reach a conclusion by the end of year 33 (conclusion would include approval of changes to the UN Charter if required), the matter under contention will be subject to binding arbitration by the International Court of Justice, which will resolve the matter within one year (ie by the end of year 34). If the results of the arbitration require an amendment of the UN Charter that amendment will be passed by a simple majority of the members of the UNGA and subsequent amendment at national level by more than half of the UN members.

MINIMUM CRITERIA

Elect the Council proposes four minimum criteria for candidates, to be included in the draft UNGA resolution, with the caveat that adherence to these criteria would be left to each region to monitor and apply. The criteria are:

- Experience (i.e. peacekeeping deployment, engagement in humanitarian support, conflict resolution and participation in peacebuilding) and capacity (i.e. resources such as diplomatic missions in New York, Geneva and Nairobi, globally and in conflict-affected regions)

- In financial good standing with the UN and its agencies

- Willingness to shoulder additional financial contributions to UN efforts on international peace and security, as determined by the UNGA

- Respect for open, inclusive and accountable governance, the rule of law and international human rights standards

Expectedly electoral regions would adopt their own modalities to identify candidates (rotation, competition, additional regional criteria, etc.). In line with current practice, each region would present their candidates to the UNGA where actual voting would occur. Regional groups would be requested to take particular notice of cross-regional interest groups such as those from the Small Island and Developing States and the Arab group.
Regions would therefore determine how they wish to occupy their respective quota of seats. In some regions regional leaders could be re-elected on the five-year ticket (or rotate on an agreed internal arrangement) and the three-year category of membership would allow for flexibility and representativeness for other members, either through a competitive process or a restricted system of rotation (since not all states would qualify or wish to serve on the UNSC). In this manner regions would, should they so desire, be able to ensure continuity and ensure the inclusion of states whose exclusion would undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of any proposal on reform.

**ELECTED SEATS PER REGION**

*Figure 2: Proposed elected seats per electoral region*

Elect the Council proposes that each region be allowed to elect one country for a renewable five year term to the UNSC for every 22 states in its group (rounded off) – these can be referred to as regional powers. Elect the Council also proposes that each region be allowed to elect two states for a non-renewable term of three years for every 22 states (rounded off) in each electoral group. This gives a UNSC membership of 24, consisting of eight states elected for five years and 16 states elected for three years.

In this manner purported regional powers could remain on the UNSC (with the support of others in the group) but could also rotate or be challenged within their region.

Annex D presents the impact on the size of the Council of increasing or decreasing the number of states per three/five year seat for illustrative purposes.

As the number of states in any group increase or decrease, this will automatically affect the allocation of seats in the UNSC, thereby accommodating changes in the membership of the various voting regions.

The result is a simple yet flexible structure that is representative of the various regions and of the membership of the UN generally in an equitable manner, and that balances the need for an increase in size (legitimacy) with the need for effectiveness and efficiency.

The current composition of voting groups and the proposed number of three- and five-year seats within a reformed UNSC are summarised in Table 1 and presented graphically in Figure 2.
Table 1: Calculation of proposed elected seats per region in the UNSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional group</th>
<th>Current number of members</th>
<th>Current % of members</th>
<th>Five-year seats on UNSC</th>
<th>Three-year seats on UNSC</th>
<th>Total elected seats on UNSC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>28.0</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>EEG</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRULAC</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17.1</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
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Note: The US is viewed as part of the WEOG in the table above. It currently has observer status with the WEOG.

**TRANSITIONARY MEASURE FOR THE P5**

Although the world is experiencing changes in power configurations, these take time and the P5 members will not readily agree to changes that dilute their power and status. Current arrangements provide the P5 with unprecedented privilege that they would not otherwise obtain. Elect the Council therefore proposes a 20-year transition period during which the current P5 would remain members of the UNSC by occupying three of the eight available five-year seats in their relevant regions and that the UNSC be enlarged from 24 to 26 members to accommodate the two remaining members of the P5. Thus three of the P5 members would occupy the following three five-year seats:

1. Asia-Pacific Group – China. This group would still have to elect states to fill one additional five-year seat and four three-year seats during the 15-year transitional phase.

2. EEG – Russia. This group would still have to elect states to fill two three-year seats during the 15-year transitional phase.

3. WEOG – USA, UK or France. This group would still have to elect two states to fill three-year seats during the 20-year transitional phase.

In addition the African Group would have to elect two five-year members and four three-year seats and GRULAG would have to elect two five-year members and four three-year seats.

After 20 years the current P5 members would only serve on the UNSC if elected by their respective regions or if they qualify in terms of the global powers criteria (see below).
GLOBAL POWERS

After the 20 year transition period any single country (or group of states who are prepared to act as a single group within the UNSC) that meet all three of the following criteria would automatically qualify for a seat on the UNSC:

- 3% of global population; and
- 6% of global gross domestic product (at MER); and
- 6% of global defence expenditure.

These seats would be in addition to the 24 elected seats and the UNSC would therefore be expanded by the inclusion of these global powers, most likely to a total of 26 or 27 seats.30

The global powers (or groups) that qualify for this category of seats cease being members once they do not meet one or more of the three criteria on population, economic size and defence expenditure. To this end the office of the Secretary General will review the global powers membership on an annual basis relying on an assessment provided by an international organization with the required statistical expertise and track record to undertake such a review. Global powers membership is therefore reviewed annually.

Similar to states that are elected to the UNSC, global powers will be expected to contribute additionally to the UN budget as determined by the UNGA.

The votes of global powers (or groups represented on the UNSC that collectively meet the minimum criteria) will count as three votes. A UNSC with 26 members that included two global powers would therefore have potentially 24+6=30 votes. A two-thirds affirmative vote with all members present and voting therefore requires 20 votes.

Figure 3: Interim and final composition of the UNSC
States that qualify for membership in terms of the global powers criteria will lose their voting membership within the five groups (such as WEOG) that nominate the 24 other members of the UNSC for election within the UNGA. In addition, states that band together to occupy a global powers seat will also lose their voting membership within their groups. Global powers and countries that are members of coalitions (for global power seats) may not vote during the elections of other members of the UNSC within the UNGA.

VOTING AND VOTES

Elect the Council proposes that both substantive and procedural decisions within the UNSC require a two-thirds affirmative majority. Similar to current provisions, parties to a conflict would have the right to be heard but may not vote (if they are serving members of the Council).

Voting Majorities during the transition phase

A vote cast by a current P5 member will count as follows during the 20-year transition period: five votes (years 1 to 5); four votes (years 6 to 10); three votes (years 11 to 15); and two votes (years 16 to 20). The votes of states that meet all three of the global criteria for great powers during the transition phase will never count for less than 3 votes.

The maximum number of votes during a session of the Council would therefore be 46, 41, 36 and 31 in each of the four successive five-year periods. Thus, during the first five-year interim period the P5 would have 25 out of an available 46 votes, 20 out of 41 available votes during the second five-year period, etc. See Figure 4.
Figure 4: Votes in the UNSC during transition

![Votes in the UNSC during transition](image)

After the 20-year transition period the vote by a global power (or group assuming a global power seat) will count for three votes.

**TIME-OUT ON KEY ISSUES**

In the run-up to the dissolution of the current structure of the UNSC, the Council should agree to a list of up to five specific issues to be placed in a moratorium (‘time-out’) for a period not exceeding 20 years after the enactment of the enabling UNGA amendment to the UN Charter. During this period a reformed UNSC may not take binding resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on that specific country or bi-lateral issue except to maintain, terminate or reasonably modify existing decisions. This proposal would remove particularly intractable regional issues that could block reform from the active purview of the UNSC for a set period of time.

**PHASING AND STAGGERED ELECTIONS**

Elect the Council proposes that elections for both categories of three and five-year seats eventually be staggered to allow for continuity. States elected during the first year after reform starts will therefore serve for longer terms.

Annex E presents an example of a staggered electoral cycle.
RULES OF PROCEDURE

Article 30 of the UN Charter stipulates that the UNSC shall adopt its own rules of procedure. The Council did so in 1946 when it adopted its Provisional Rules of Procedure (S/96), which continue to be provisional although amended several times since then.

Elect the Council proposes that the UNSC would provisionally adopt and recommend (with a two-thirds majority of member states) draft rules of procedure to the UNGA, and do so within one year of the enabling UNGA resolution. The UNGA would be required to approve these rules of procedure by means of a two-thirds majority vote of member states within one year after receipt of the draft. Pending such approval, the UNSC should be allowed to operate based on the draft rules of procedure. Should the UNSC be unwilling or unable to submit draft rules of procedure to the UNGA, the latter would be able to finalise and adopt, by a simple majority, its own version of the rules to which the UNSC shall adhere. If no agreement can be reached within the UNGA within an additional year, the issue shall be referred to the International Court of Justice for a final and binding decision on appropriate Rules of Procedure.

A member of the UNSC can be suspended from membership of the UNSC whilst it is considered to be in flagrant violation of the UN Charter by a super-majority of 80% of votes. Such suspension shall be reviewed annually.

NEXT STEPS

Elect the Council is only focussed on reform of the UNSC, not on the reform of the UNGA, the relationship between the UNGA and the Security Council or changes to the process to elect the UN Secretary-General.  

In accordance with Article 108 of the UN Charter, Elect the Council will focus its efforts on working with member states towards a UNGA resolution on an amendment to the Charter. This requires a two-thirds majority vote by UNGA members, and then requires ratification at national level in accordance with the respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the members of the UN, including all the P5 members.

The UNGA resolution (a draft of which will be attached to the final version of this document as an annex) would amend articles 23 to 32, and 109 of the UN Charter.

Elect the Council intends to build a global partnership that will mobilise for member state action based on the draft resolution. Elect the Council hopes, over time, to receive the support of like-minded states, global civil society, private foundations, business, academics and interested individuals.

This process should eventually culminate in a vote in the UNGA.
Like member states, civil society, academia and the business community will need to compromise in search of a common position based on principle and transcend the inevitable parochial responses that often surface during these discussions.

As hosting organization the Institute for Security Studies will establish a small international project secretariat (www.issafrica.org), focussing most of its efforts on working virtually and using social media.

CONCLUSION

It is hardly possible to overstate the contribution that the UN has made to issues that affect the daily lives of all of the world’s people. No country has felt strongly enough about its treatment at the hands of the UNSC to leave the UN (the UN Charter does not provide for withdrawal) although Indonesia nominally went through such a process in 1965. Despite some being placed under sanction and even subjected to armed action authorised by the Security Council all states have remained engaged with the UN.

We cannot assume that this generally favourable situation will continue. Wealthy states are frustrated by waste and inefficiency, while poor states complain about lack of representation in the Council. The UN as a whole suffers since progress on UNSC reform is stalled and the intense political divides that spill over into other processes and vote buying. In reality, representivity and effectiveness are two sides of the same coin and have a deep impact on one another.

The current impasse on UNSC reform blocks progress and efficiency at many other levels, including reform of the secretariat, the UNGA, ECOSOC and the Human Rights Council, and threatens the legitimacy and efficacy of other important global institutions such as the International Criminal Court. The result is a divided organisation – between the power of the majority and the power of the purse, and between those states that favour a more interventionist approach to peace and security issues and states that emphasise national sovereignty. An integrated and interdependent world needs a different approach that places global concerns first as populations, trade and challenges expand. A Council where members are more clearly elected and therefore representative of their regions has the promise to provide such a different approach. These developments will likely result in a more cautious Council than one dominated by Western powers, but one whose authority and decisions will carry much more force and legitimacy.

UNSC reform is not an easy or comfortable process. Various states, coalitions and interest groups will actively oppose and even work to undermine a campaign that weakens their purported advantage. Civil society organisations and business will also differ in their approaches and preferences. For its part Elect the Council intends to pursue its objective based on a clear, principled and detailed approach that is sensitive but not subservient to the realities of power.

Contact us at: electthecouncil@issafrica.org
ANNEX A

DRAFT UNGA RESOLUTION

Outstanding
PREVIOUS EFFORTS

Numerous proposals and formulas have been tabled over several decades as part of efforts to arrive at an acceptable formula for a reformed UNSC. The two options contained in the 2005 In larger freedom report by the UNSG are perhaps the best known, advocating for an increase in membership from the current 15 to 24 members. The then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan first submitted these two options in 2004 as part of the report from the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: our shared responsibility, as a follow-up to the 2000 Millennium Summit and ahead of the 2005 Summit. Progress proved impossible and the subsequent 2005 World Summit Outcome Document again limply committed leaders to ‘early reform of the Security Council ... in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions’.

Subsequent proposals included additional permanent seats and various permutations of semi-permanent seats, as well as the expansion of the number of non-permanent seats. These proposals came from a range of informal groupings (such as the L69 Group) and regional organisations such as the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Caribbean Community and the African Group. Each permutation has its advocates and opponents – and the intergovernmental process becomes more complicated with each new set of demands and variations. Thus the G4 struggles to excite others about its ambitions for permanent seats, some P5 members claim that they are open to expansion (even with new permanent seats) but disagree on which states to support, the UfC struggles to move beyond broad principles involving longer-term seats and a commitment to an increase in size, the Arab Group wants its own permanent seat, the East Europeans have advocated for a second dedicated non-permanent set for themselves, and the Small Island Developing States group wants a dedicated cross-regional seat in return for its support for additional permanent seats.

Groups such as the Small Five (S5) and its successor, the 22-member ACT grouping (to improve Accountability, Coherence and Transparency) take a different approach. Seeking to adjust working methods to avoid the issue of composition and the veto, their attempts generally take their cue from the small window of opportunity for UNSC reform contained in the 2000 and 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Documents. In December 2012 France resurrected the calls for veto restraint in the case of mass atrocities (still to be defined), while ACT promotes veto restraint on genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

In preparation for an Open Debate on the UN Charter under the presidency of Venezuela scheduled for 15 February 2016, What’s in Blue wrote that: ‘Some members may support the idea of veto restraint in the debate, especially in the case of atrocity crimes. While the veto is a privilege granted in the UN Charter, a number of member states have expressed concerns about the abuse of the veto—and the threat of the veto—by some of the permanent members. Recent veto restraint initiatives by the ACT grouping and France and Mexico have
garnered the support of a large number of UN member states. The ACT initiative (or code of conduct) had 110 supporters as of 12 January 2016, while the France/Mexico declaration had 86 supporters as of 2 November 2015. Calls for veto restraint were raised by France, New Zealand and Spain when the Council last held a debate (S/PV.7389) on the UN Charter in February 2015 under China’s presidency of the Council. At the same meeting, Angola advocated reform of the veto.’
ANNEX C

CURRENT UNSC VOTING GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EEG</th>
<th>GRULAC</th>
<th>WEOG</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Bhutan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Marshall Islands &amp;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Federated States of Micronesia &amp;</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
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<td>Myanmar</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
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An Arab swing seat is based on an informal agreement whereby the Asia Pacific and Arab Groups take turns every two years in providing a suitable candidate.
## ANNEX D

### ALTERNATIVE SIZES OF THE UNSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional group</th>
<th>21 states per seat</th>
<th>22 states per seat</th>
<th>23 states per seat</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>African</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRULAC</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEOG</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PROPOSED ELECTORAL CYCLE

All 24 members are elected in the first year and serve, in some instances, longer first terms to allow for the introduction of a staggered election roster.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Y1</th>
<th>Y2</th>
<th>Y3</th>
<th>Y4</th>
<th>Y5</th>
<th>Y6</th>
<th>Y7</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 yr states</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 yr states</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total elections</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Remaining P5 members</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Size of Council</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
NOTES

1 The voting around the 1965 amendment is interesting: ‘... the expansion was achieved even if four out of the P5 had initial serious reservations. African, Asian and Latin American states drafted a resolution, pushed it through the GA, where France and Soviet Union voted against, the UK and US abstained and only Republic of China (Taiwan) among the P5 voted in favor. All P5 however, to avoid being seen as dissenters, obtained ratifications in their parliaments, the first one ironically coming from the Soviet Union initially voting against in the GA. On 31 August 1965 the SC membership increased to 15.’ Vesselin Popovski, Reforming and innovating the United Nations Security Council, Commission on Global Security Justice and Governance, background paper, 2015, available at www.globalsecurityjusticegovernance.org


6 The new permanent seats would not have veto rights and the situation would be reviewed after 10 years.


10 On 6 July 2005 the G4 members tabled their draft framework resolution calling for UNSC enlargement to 25 members, including six additional permanent seats. If the G4 proposal were adopted, the new seats would, according to article 27 of the UN Charter, automatically enjoy veto rights – although the G4 members have accepted to forego their right of veto for at least 15 years.

11 At its core the UfC consists of 12–14 states, but its views are shared by an additional 20–30 others that also do not want additional permanent seats, especially if it would include the veto. The group is led by Italy, Spain, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Pakistan and South Korea. In addition to Turkey, Indonesia and others, China and Indonesia also take an active part in this group, as do a number of African states. See Lydia Swart, Timeline on UN Security Council reform 1992–2015, notes prepared for roundtable on UNSC reform, 17 April 2015, 5. Interviews in New York, April 2015.

12 Developed from its previous position, known as the Harare Declaration, the African Union (AU) tabled its proposal (the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus), calling for 11 additional members on the Security Council, taking it to 26) in July 2005, with Africa gaining two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats that would rotate between African states. The AU position is that new seats gain all existing privileges, including veto powers, and that the AU would determine the criteria. Nigeria and South Africa, two of the contenders for these seats, have indicated a degree of flexibility on the issue of the veto and have argued that they would serve in their national capacity when elected by the AU.

13 In September 2008, with the GA 62/557 decision, member states agreed to move the deadlocked discussions from the open-ended working group to the intergovernmental negotiations in an informal plenary of the UNGA. This would allow for a decision without consensus – a move fiercely opposed by the UfC group – and that decisions could be taken by a two-thirds majority vote. As a result, the rules of procedure became a major divisive issue.

14 In April 2005, the UfC first proposed a Green and a Blue Model for UNSC reform. The Green Model proposed to expand the UNSC with an additional 10 elected seats. All 20 elected members would
serve in the Council for two-year terms and be eligible for re-election. The Blue Model foresees longer-term seats, while at the same time adding regular two-year elected seats to the current ones. Longer-term seats would be elected for three or four years and might run for re-election. See Global Policy, Background on Security Council reform, www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform/49885.html?itemid=1321m. On 26 July 2005, Italy, Argentina, Canada, Colombia and Pakistan, representing the UfC states, proposed to the UNGA to maintain the five permanent seats and raise the number of non-permanent seats to 20. The non-permanent seats would be elected by the UNGA for a two-year term and would be eligible for immediate re-election, subject to the decision of the respective geographical groups. On 11 April 2005, China ’embraced’ this initiative. On 20 April 2009, Colombia and Italy, as representatives of the UfC group, presented a new model for the creation of a new category of seats, still non-permanent but elected for an extended duration (three -to five-year terms) without the possibility of immediate re-election. These new seats would not be allocated to individual states, but rather to regional groups on a rotational basis. Small- and medium-sized states would now also be eligible for regular, non-permanent seats. The proposal included various options ranging from abolishing the veto to limiting the application of the veto on Chapter VII matters. See Elisabetta Martini, UN Security Council reform – current developments, Instituto Affari Internazionali, www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/pdfs/IAI_Report_3.pdf, accessed 2 February 2015. The most recent proposal from the UfC for a UNSC of up to 26 members, circulated in March 2015 shortly ahead of the circulation of the framework document by Rattray, reiterates its support for a new category of longer-term seats with the possibility of an immediate re-election, as well as an increase in the number of two-year non-permanent seats. See UfC, UN Security Council reform is possible, 25 March 2015, www.italyun.esteri.it/NR/rdonlyres/666B4E6B-5486-43EB-91DB-BE7CB7FE15A8/0/UfCdocument25March2015.pdf, accessed 23 April 2015.

16 Ibid
18 The US supports the membership of Japan and India and a small number of additional non-permanent seats. The UK and France essentially support the G4 position (but with a variation on the issue of the veto), with the expansion of permanent and non-permanent seats and the accession of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan to permanent member status, as well as an increase in seats of African states. China supported the stronger representation of developing states, but has stopped short of endorsing India’s Security Council ambitions. Russia has endorsed India’s candidature for a permanent seat.
19 In 2006, former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer said that Germany would also accept a common European seat – but as long as there is little sign that France and the UK will give up their own seats, Germany should also have a seat. As a result, Germany is apparently willing to consider intermediary arrangements (such as those proposed by the UK and France). Within the EU, the basis for such an approach would be its Common Foreign and Security Policy, but the question is whether a common European seat should necessarily be recognised as a formal EU seat (and therefore form part of the Lisbon Treaty). Only states can be members of the UN, according to the UN Charter.

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2005 Millennium+5 Summit.

UNSG Kofi Annan favoured making the decision quickly, and argued for a decision at the September 2005 Millennium+5 Summit.

UNSC Resolution 1991 (XVIII), which was adopted in 1963 and took effect in 1965. Under that resolution, the five seats originally corresponding to the African and Asia-Pacific states were combined. In reality, the candidates for election to the African seats (three) and Asia-Pacific seats (two) operate separately. Peace candidates are currently funded by assessments, using a formula derived from the regular funding scale that includes a weighted surcharge for the P5 members, which must approve all peacekeeping operations. This surcharge serves to offset discounted peacekeeping assessment rates for less developed states. The current scales of assessments are set out in UNGA Resolution 67/238 Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations, A/RES/67/238, 11 February 2013.

This draws on the provisions contained in the African Union’s Protocol on its Peace and Security Council, which provides for two categories of two and three-year membership. Based on double the actual fraction of five-year members, with the result rounded off. Changing the number of states per elected member on the UNSC to 23 or 25 would change the size of the Council to 25 and 23 members respectively. See annex C.

The proposed size is similar to options A and B set out in the 2005 In larger freedom report, as well as the 1997 recommendations by the president of the UNGA and chairperson of the OEWG. The number of states in WEOG and the Asia-Pacific group will be affected should the USA, China and India qualify as global powers and take up their seats within a reformed UNSC and after the 15 year transitional period. These changes to not affect the number of 3 or 5-year seats calculated per voting group.

Using the International Futures forecasting system (see pardee.du.ed), the USA and China would qualify for membership of the UNSC based on these three criteria, joined by India as from around 2032. The EU28 could, should they desire to act as a single ‘country’ in the UNSC, also qualify.

It is generally held that reform of the UNSC encompasses five key issues: (1) categories of membership; (2) the question of the veto held by the five permanent seats; (3) regional representation; (4) the size of an enlarged Council and its working methods; and the (5) Security Council–General Assembly relationship. UNGA Decision 62/557 of September 2008. Elect the Council primarily deals with the first four of these aspects.


See Lydia Swart, Timeline of UN Security Council Reform, last updated 12 November 2015, for a useful summary. Available at www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/681

Plan A calls for creating six new permanent seats plus three new non-permanent seats, for a total of 24 seats in the council. Plan B calls for creating eight new seats in a new class of members, which would serve for four years, subject to renewal, plus one non-permanent seat, also for a total of 24. UNSG Kofi Annan favoured making the decision quickly, and argued for a decision at the September 2005 Millennium+5 Summit.

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Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats. Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat. The composition of the UNSC would also be reviewed in 2020.

In July 2009, a joint UK/French statement proposed the option of intermediate reform by including a new category of renewable seats with a longer term that could, at the end of an initial phase, become permanent. This was the subject of the September 2009 round of negotiations led by the Afghan ambassador to the UN, Zahir Tanin. On this occasion South Africa stated that it considered this specific issue a ‘pretext to retain the status quo’. Italy also voiced its doubts about intermediate reform. In total, eight rounds of negotiations on a text to reform the Council were conducted. See Global Policy Forum, Reforming the working methods of the UN Security Council: the ACT Initiative, www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/200-reform/52474-reforming-the-working-methods-of-the-un-security-council-the-act-initiative.html.


In June 2005, the foreign ministers of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) called for a permanent Muslim seat on the UNSC.

CARICOM has come out in favour of the veto for the new seats advocated by the G4 in return for a dedicated non-permanent seat for small island states. Centre for UN Reform Education, Governing & managing change at the United Nations: reform of the Security Council from 1945 to September 2013, September 2013, vol. 1, appendix VIII.

Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland. The group came up with proposals that could be passed by a simple majority. In May 2012 the S5 initiative led to a draft resolution (A/66/L.42/Rev.2), which contained several recommendations for the Security Council as regards its relationship with the UNGA; the effectiveness of decisions; the relationship with subsidiary bodies; the operations mandated by the Council; governance and accountability; and the appointment of the UNSG. In addition, the draft resolution called on the P5 members to reassess their use of the veto: firstly by requiring them to explain why a veto is employed, or even considered; and secondly, by asking them to refrain from employing a veto when Council actions are intended to prevent mass atrocity crimes. This second proposition divided the P5 and the non-permanent seats. Reiterating that the Council should decide on its own working methods, the P5 members let it be known that this was a decision they alone would take. Eventually, putting the S5 initiative to vote in the UNGA was frustrated by efforts from the P5 and the UFC group, and the draft resolution was withdrawn after a legal opinion requested by the president of the UNGA indicated that working methods required an affirmative vote by two-thirds of the membership.

The 24 UN member states that have tried since 2013 to improve accountability, coherence and transparency (ACT), while avoiding the membership issue, include four of the S5 states. Similar to the S5 initiative, ACT seeks to avoid involvement in the debate on reforming and extending the membership of the Council. The members are from various regions. ACT also focused on new topics, such as the role of the Council in conflict prevention (according to Chapter VI of the UN Charter) and the Council’s relationship with regional organisations (Chapter VIII). Due to its larger membership, ACT aims to work on a range of topics in parallel, involving smaller teams led by different states. For instance, Liechtenstein focuses on the relationship of the Council with the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, while Uruguay addresses the


36 The 24 UN member states that have tried since 2013 to improve accountability, coherence and transparency (ACT), while avoiding the membership issue, include four of the S5 states. Similar to the S5 initiative, ACT seeks to avoid involvement in the debate on reforming and extending the membership of the Council. The members are from various regions. ACT also focused on new topics, such as the role of the Council in conflict prevention (according to Chapter VI of the UN Charter) and the Council’s relationship with regional organisations (Chapter VIII). Due to its larger membership, ACT aims to work on a range of topics in parallel, involving smaller teams led by different states. For instance, Liechtenstein focuses on the relationship of the Council with the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, while Uruguay addresses the

Veto restraint has been on the agenda since 1992.

The current non-permanent seats allocate one seat for the GRULAC group; two seats every even calendar year for the WEOG (competition is open between various subgroups consisting of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden); the CANZ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and Benelux (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands); one seat for the EEG every odd calendar year; three seats for the African Group with its five sub-regions; and two seats for the Asia-Pacific Group/Group of Asia and the Pacific Small Island Developing States.